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S e ctio n 6 501( e) Regu latio ns I points to remember

Tax Court Invalidates New
Section 6501(e) Regulations
By Steve R. Johnson*

T

he title of an article of mine in the Fall 2009 issue of the NewsQuarterly asked
“What’s Next in the Section 6501(e) Overstated Basis Controversy?” The Tax Court
answered that question on May 6, 2010, in its decision Intermountain Insurance
Service of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 11. In that decision, the court
invalidated two temporary regulations that had been issued on September 24, 2009:
sections 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT.

The Tax Court was unanimous in its
result, but seriously divided as to the
reasons for the result. The Intermountain
decision is important as to both the
six-year statute of limitations on
assessment and the validity of tax
regulations generally. It is certain,

however, that the decision will not be the
last word on either of these topics.

Background
There are many exceptions to the usual
three-year statute of limitations on
assessments. One is section 6501(e)(1)
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(A)(i), which gives the Service six years
to assess income tax liabilities “[i]f the
taxpayer omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein
[which] is in excess of 25% of the
amount of gross income stated in the
return.” Section 6229(c)(2) provides a
similar exception for cases governed by
the TEFRA partnership audit and
litigation rules.
These exceptions undoubtedly apply
when the taxpayer omits enough taxable
receipts, but it has been controversial
whether they apply when the understatement arises instead from overstated
basis of sold assets. As detailed in the
Fall 2009 article, the case law on the
section 6501(e) overstated basis issue is
divided, but the Service suffered a string
of defeats in 2009 cases.
To reverse its fortunes, Treasury
issued the September 24 regulations in
both temporary and proposed form.
Aggressively, the temporary regulations
were declared to apply to tax years still
open to assessment on the date of
issuance, with the intention that they
apply to all pending cases, including
those which taxpayers had won but in
which the decisions had not yet become
final. See T.D. 9466, 2009-43 I.R.B.
551. Both the new regulations and their
effective date have been highly controversial from their inception.

Intermountain
Intermountain involves what the Service
considers to be an abusive tax shelter
involving overstated basis. Having failed
to act within the normal three years, the
Service relied on the six-year limitations
period. Less than a month before
issuance of the temporary regulations,
the Tax Court had decided the statute of
limitations issue in Intermountain’s favor.
T.C. Memo. 2009-195. Based on the
new regulations, the Service filed
motions to vacate and for reconsideration
of that decision.
By 13 to 0, the Tax Court held against
the Service, but the 13 judges fell into

three camps. Seven judges, in an
opinion written by Judge Wherry,
explored the possibility that, as actually
drafted, the effective date provision did
not effectuate Treasury’s intention to
reach not-yet-final cases. Although
advancing a questionable “plain
meaning” analysis, the majority chose
not to rest the decision on that ground.
Instead, the majority examined the
substantive validity of the temporary
regulations. Assuming arguendo that
Chevron provides the governing standard, the majority concluded that the
regulations did not pass muster under
Chevron Step One or Brand X. See
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005); Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). Specifically, the
majority concluded that the Supreme
Court’s Colony decision a half century
ago had held that what is now section
6501(e) unambiguously precludes the
position taken in the temporary regulations. Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357
U.S. 28 (1958). The majority also noted,
but felt it unnecessary to rule on, the
taxpayer’s argument that the temporary
regulations have impermissibly retroactive effect.
Four other judges concurred in an
opinion penned by Judge Cohen. This
concurrence would have resolved the
case on narrower grounds. Motions such
as the Service’s typically are granted only
in unusual circumstances. An intervening statutory change can be such a
circumstance. Alioto v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2008-185, vacating T.C.
Memo. 2006-199. The concurrence
would have held, however, that an
intervening regulatory change does not
rise to the same level, thus is insufficient
to warrant vacating or reconsidering.
Judges Halpern and Holmes concurred in another opinion. These judges
rejected the majority’s effective date and
Chevron analyses but saw the temporary
regulations as invalid on procedural
grounds. The Administrative Procedure
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Act (“APA”) applies to rulemaking by
federal agencies, including the Treasury
Department. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
Unless a stated exception applies,
regulations are validly promulgated only
if they go through the notice-and-comment process prescribed by 5 U.S.C.
§ 553. The temporary regulations were
not promulgated through this process.
Nonetheless, the Service defended their
validity on two grounds: that the
regulations fall within the APA exception
for merely interpretive rules and that
Congress implicitly excepted temporary
tax regulations from the notice-andcomment requirement. The Halpern/
Holmes concurrence rejected both
contentions, and thus would hold the
regulations to be procedurally invalid
under the APA.

Evaluation
All three opinions in Intermountain
reflected distaste for what the judges
viewed as overly zealous use of the
regulations process. The Service saw the
Intermountain tax shelter as abusive. It is
worth remembering that not just
taxpayers, but the Service, too, can
commit tax abuse.
Although motivated by a common
impulse, the Tax Court judges differed
greatly as to the doctrine by which to
make that impulse legally operative. In
my view, Judges Halpern and Holmes
had the best view of the case. The
omission of notice-and-comment is not
justified by either of the grounds asserted
by the Service.
The Service’s “merely interpretive”
argument is hopeless. The temporary
regulations at issue were promulgated
under the general authority of section
7805(a), not specific authority within
sections 6501 or 6229. The Service and
tax lawyers as a whole have long called
general-authority regulations “interpretive” and specific-authority regulations
“legislative.” It is high time that we broke
ourselves of that bad habit. “Interpretive”
and “legislative” regulations have well
understood meanings in administrative

S ocial S ecurity Be n efits Fo rmula I points to remember

law—meanings which have nothing to
do with the general-authority versus
specific-authority distinction. Instead,
legislative regulations have “force of law”
character—they make binding law or
change the law—while interpretive
regulations merely explain the agency’s
view of the statute. E.g., Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979).
Tax regulations that make binding law
are legislative whether they are promulgated under specific authority or general
authority. The temporary regulations at
issue clearly are legislative; their point
was not to explain the Service’s view of
section 6501 but to change the law by
administratively reversing the law as
articulated by the adverse cases.
The Service’s argument that Congress
excepted temporary tax regulations from
APA notice-and-comment is better but
probably not good enough. The argument is based on inference, not explicit
text. Yet Congress has provided that
other statutes may modify APA requirements only expressly, not impliedly. 5
U.S.C. § 559.
The arguments advanced in the other
Intermountain opinions do not strike me as
persuasive. First, as pointed out by Judges
Halpern and Holmes, the regulations’
effective date provision is ambiguous, not
plain. The provision might be read to mean
“open under the normal three-year period,”
as the Intermountain majority read it, or it
might mean “open under the six-year
period, as that period is extended by this
regulation,” as Treasury and the Service
intended. An agency’s construction of its
own ambiguous regulation is entitled to
deference. E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997); Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-46 (1993).
Second, the majority likely is wrong as
to its Chevron Step One analysis. Colony
itself did not say that its result was
unambiguously commanded by the
statute. Moreover, Colony construed a
predecessor of current section 6501(e),
and the current statute arguably is
somewhat more congenial to the Service’s
position. Finally, as noted in the Fall

2009 article, the Service won a number
of the cases after Colony but before
2009. There are two possibilities. Either
the courts holding for the Service failed to
notice that Colony had settled the issue,
or the Intermountain majority overplayed
its hand in characterizing Colony’s
holding. I think that the second of these
alternatives better states the matter.
Third, the narrow ground offered by
Judge Cohen and the judges joining her
is dubious. Yes, a statute outranks a
regulation. But a validly promulgated
legislative regulation has force of law
status. Thus, the distinction offered by
Judge Cohen’s concurrence is not a
meaningful difference.

Predictions
The Tax Court’s Intermountain decision
surely is not the last shot that will be
fired in the overstated basis statute of
limitations battle. The Government may
appeal Intermountain, and the validity
and applicability of the new regulations
will surely be tested in other cases in
the future.
Based on the above analysis, the
temporary regulations should continue to
be invalidated. However, when they have
been finalized after completion of
notice-and-comment, the regulations
should be upheld, particularly if applied
only prospectively. Taxpayers who already
have won their cases should be safe, but
taxpayers whose cases have not yet been
decided will be in jeopardy. n
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